QUCEH Working Paper Series
Working papers by QUCEH Research Associates, Research Affiliates and Research Students are distributed from this page. They are also available through Econstor, a RePEc-compatible Open Access server which provides a platform for the free distribution of academic literature in economics. Please contact Chris Colvin (chris.colvin@qub.ac.uk) for more information about the series.
Full Archive of the QUCEH Working Paper Series:
Abstracts of Recent QUCEH Working Papers:
No. 19-08:
Alan Fernihough, and Cormac Ó Gráda
'Across the Sea to Ireland: Return Atlantic Migration before the First World War'
November 2019
Are return migrants ‘losers’ who fail to adapt to the challenges of the host economy, and thereby exacerbate the brain drain linked to emigration? Or are they ‘winners’ whose return enhances the human and physical capital of the home country? These questions are the subject of a burgeoning literature. This paper analyze a new database culled from the 1911 Irish population census to address these issues for returnees to Ireland from North America more than a century ago. The evidence suggests that those who returned had the edge over the population as a whole in terms of human capital, if not also over those who remained abroad.
Alan Fernihough, and Cormac Ó Gráda
'Across the Sea to Ireland: Return Atlantic Migration before the First World War'
November 2019
Are return migrants ‘losers’ who fail to adapt to the challenges of the host economy, and thereby exacerbate the brain drain linked to emigration? Or are they ‘winners’ whose return enhances the human and physical capital of the home country? These questions are the subject of a burgeoning literature. This paper analyze a new database culled from the 1911 Irish population census to address these issues for returnees to Ireland from North America more than a century ago. The evidence suggests that those who returned had the edge over the population as a whole in terms of human capital, if not also over those who remained abroad.
No. 19-07:
Christopher L. Colvin, and Paul Winfree
'Applied History, Applied Economics, and Economic History'
October 2019
As a new field of academic enquiry, applied history has a unique opportunity to learn lessons from other applied fields. In this essay, we set out how we think applied historians can learn from the mistakes of applied economists and economic policymakers in their use, and abuse, of economic theory and economic history. What we call the New Applied History has the potential to improve the way policymaking is conducted. But only if its practitioners understand the power, and limitations, of theory. We apply our ideas to the case of budgetary policymaking in the United States.
Christopher L. Colvin, and Paul Winfree
'Applied History, Applied Economics, and Economic History'
October 2019
As a new field of academic enquiry, applied history has a unique opportunity to learn lessons from other applied fields. In this essay, we set out how we think applied historians can learn from the mistakes of applied economists and economic policymakers in their use, and abuse, of economic theory and economic history. What we call the New Applied History has the potential to improve the way policymaking is conducted. But only if its practitioners understand the power, and limitations, of theory. We apply our ideas to the case of budgetary policymaking in the United States.
No. 19-06:
Liam Kennedy, and Peter M. Solar
'The Famine that Wasn’t? 1799-1801 in Ireland'
October 2019
Strange Times. There were back-to-back harvest failures in 1799-1800, coming fast on the heels of the insurrections of 1798. The result was massive and sustained inflation in food prices. The conundrum is why there was so little excess mortality. Our approach is to begin by discussing the harvest failures of 1799 and 1800, drawing some implications from the price movements of foodstuffs in Ireland and Britain. We then present evidence from our limited sample of parish registers that suggests that excess mortality was probably quite limited, as was the check to births. A further striking feature of the period, and hardly unrelated, was the role of the state. Though heavily absorbed with the “high politics” of the Union, politicians and policy makers took swift and determined action to stave off distress and public disorder. The range and effectiveness of these measures are assessed. We draw attention to a variety of local initiatives to grapple with problems of food scarcity and lack of purchasing power and offer an analytical sketch as to how the relationship between farmers and labourers might have shaped the outcome of the crisis in the countryside. The concluding section reflects on methods of calculating the impact of state-sponsored famine relief – the lives saved in a sense – and argues that a dynamic rather than a static approach is what is required. And second, the limitations of inflated food prices as indicators of famine conditions, at least under certain forms of peasant agriculture, are laid bare. These two sets of argument help unlock the conundrum as to why excess mortality did not give rise to mass mortality under environmental conditions as unpropitious as those of 1800-01. There may be implications here for the understanding of food crises in rural societies with large subsistence sectors elsewhere in the pre-industrial world.
Liam Kennedy, and Peter M. Solar
'The Famine that Wasn’t? 1799-1801 in Ireland'
October 2019
Strange Times. There were back-to-back harvest failures in 1799-1800, coming fast on the heels of the insurrections of 1798. The result was massive and sustained inflation in food prices. The conundrum is why there was so little excess mortality. Our approach is to begin by discussing the harvest failures of 1799 and 1800, drawing some implications from the price movements of foodstuffs in Ireland and Britain. We then present evidence from our limited sample of parish registers that suggests that excess mortality was probably quite limited, as was the check to births. A further striking feature of the period, and hardly unrelated, was the role of the state. Though heavily absorbed with the “high politics” of the Union, politicians and policy makers took swift and determined action to stave off distress and public disorder. The range and effectiveness of these measures are assessed. We draw attention to a variety of local initiatives to grapple with problems of food scarcity and lack of purchasing power and offer an analytical sketch as to how the relationship between farmers and labourers might have shaped the outcome of the crisis in the countryside. The concluding section reflects on methods of calculating the impact of state-sponsored famine relief – the lives saved in a sense – and argues that a dynamic rather than a static approach is what is required. And second, the limitations of inflated food prices as indicators of famine conditions, at least under certain forms of peasant agriculture, are laid bare. These two sets of argument help unlock the conundrum as to why excess mortality did not give rise to mass mortality under environmental conditions as unpropitious as those of 1800-01. There may be implications here for the understanding of food crises in rural societies with large subsistence sectors elsewhere in the pre-industrial world.
No. 19-05:
Christopher Coyle, Aldo Musacchio, and John D. Turner
'Law and Finance in Britain c.1900'
September 2019
In this paper, using new estimates of the size of the UK’s capital market, we examine financial development and investor protection laws in Britain c.1900 to test the influential law and finance hypothesis. Our evidence suggests that there was not a close correlation between financial development and investor protection laws c.1900 and that the size of the UK’s share market is a puzzle given the paucity of statutory investor protection. To illustrate that Britain was not unique in its approach to investor protection in this era, we examine investor protection laws across legal families c.1900.
Christopher Coyle, Aldo Musacchio, and John D. Turner
'Law and Finance in Britain c.1900'
September 2019
In this paper, using new estimates of the size of the UK’s capital market, we examine financial development and investor protection laws in Britain c.1900 to test the influential law and finance hypothesis. Our evidence suggests that there was not a close correlation between financial development and investor protection laws c.1900 and that the size of the UK’s share market is a puzzle given the paucity of statutory investor protection. To illustrate that Britain was not unique in its approach to investor protection in this era, we examine investor protection laws across legal families c.1900.
No. 19-04:
Matthias Blum, and Eoin McLaughlin
'Living standards and inequality in the Industrial Revolution: Evidence from the height of University of Edinburgh students in the 1830s'
August 2019
Trends in living standards during the Industrial Revolution is a core debate in economic history. Studies using anthropometric records from institutional sources have found downward trends in living standards during the first half of the nineteenth century. This paper contributes to this literature by utilising an overlooked source of middle and upper class anthropometric data: the height and weight of university students. Combined with more traditional anthropometric sources these data give us a snapshot into the range of living standards experienced by different sections of society in the United Kingdom. Our findings suggest that inequality was most pronounced in Ireland, followed by England. Height inequality in Scotland was still substantial, but somewhat lower in comparison.
Matthias Blum, and Eoin McLaughlin
'Living standards and inequality in the Industrial Revolution: Evidence from the height of University of Edinburgh students in the 1830s'
August 2019
Trends in living standards during the Industrial Revolution is a core debate in economic history. Studies using anthropometric records from institutional sources have found downward trends in living standards during the first half of the nineteenth century. This paper contributes to this literature by utilising an overlooked source of middle and upper class anthropometric data: the height and weight of university students. Combined with more traditional anthropometric sources these data give us a snapshot into the range of living standards experienced by different sections of society in the United Kingdom. Our findings suggest that inequality was most pronounced in Ireland, followed by England. Height inequality in Scotland was still substantial, but somewhat lower in comparison.
No. 19-03:
Christopher L. Colvin, and Philip T. Fliers
'Going Dutch: The Management of Monetary Policy in the Netherlands during the Interwar Gold Standard'
July 2019
Under what conditions can policymakers make demonstrably poor policy choices? By providing a new account of monetary policy management in the Netherlands during the interwar gold standard, we show how policymakers can fail to escape their long-held beliefs and refuse to consider available policy alternatives. Using high-frequency macroeconomic data, we are the first to document that the Netherlands’ policymakers were able to conduct an independent monetary policy in the 1930s. We then show how this independence was squandered on fixing the guilder’s exchange rate, a policy which led only to deflation, trade deficits, corporate bankruptcies and mass unemployment. We explain the government’s policy stance by documenting the beliefs of politicians and central bankers, and then by investigating how business leaders and public intellectuals attempted to influence these beliefs.
Christopher L. Colvin, and Philip T. Fliers
'Going Dutch: The Management of Monetary Policy in the Netherlands during the Interwar Gold Standard'
July 2019
Under what conditions can policymakers make demonstrably poor policy choices? By providing a new account of monetary policy management in the Netherlands during the interwar gold standard, we show how policymakers can fail to escape their long-held beliefs and refuse to consider available policy alternatives. Using high-frequency macroeconomic data, we are the first to document that the Netherlands’ policymakers were able to conduct an independent monetary policy in the 1930s. We then show how this independence was squandered on fixing the guilder’s exchange rate, a policy which led only to deflation, trade deficits, corporate bankruptcies and mass unemployment. We explain the government’s policy stance by documenting the beliefs of politicians and central bankers, and then by investigating how business leaders and public intellectuals attempted to influence these beliefs.